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DEPARTMENT
OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 377TH COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP (PACAF)
REPLY
TO
ATTN
OF: BSP
SUBJECT:
Combat Operations After Actions Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)(U)
TO:
7AF
1. (U) Type Operation: Mortar, rocket, automatic/small arms,
and ground
attacks against Tan Son Nhut Air Base and the Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area.
2. (U) Dates of Operation: 0320 hours, 31 January 1968 through 2100
hours, 31 January 1968. Small arms/automatic weapons fire and probing actions
on various parts of the perimeter continued through 9 February 1968.
3. (U) Location: Tan Son Nhut Air Base, RVN, and the adjacent Tan Son
Nhut Sensitive Area. The major
ground penetration was centered from the 049 Bunker to the 051 Gate on the
west perimeter, Enemy ground penetration attempts were also conducted at O.F.
10 (Gate 10, Southeast Perimeter) and MACV Annex (Adjacent to Gate 10).
4. (U) Command and Control Headquarters: Joint Defense Operations
Center Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area.
5. (U) Unit Commanders Engaged in Operations:
a. Lt Colonel Luu Kim Cuong
Comdr, 33rd VNAF Wing
(Comdr., TSN Sensitive Area)
b. Major Phung Van Chieu Comdr, TSN Sensitive Point
Dep Comdr, TSN Sensitive Areac. Colonel Farley E. Peebles Comdr, 377th Combat Support Gp
d. Colonel Luther J. Miller Senior Advisor AFAT #1 33rd Wing
GROUP – 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
(This Page
is Unclassified)
e. Lt Colonel Bernard L. Garred Jr.
Senior Advisor TSN Sensitive Area
f. Lt Colonel Billy J. Carter
Comdr, 377th Security Police Sq
g. Lt Colonel Peter
P. Borowski
Comdr, MACV Annex
h. Major Ronald K.
Kollhoff
Comdr, Armed Helicopter Plt,
120 Aviation Company
6. (U) Units
Engaged:
a.
2nd Services Battalion (ARVN)
b. 8th
Airborne Battalion (ARVN)
c.
53rd Regional Force Battalion (ARVN)
d.
1st Marine Battalion (ARVN)
e.
4th Marine Battalion (ARVN)
f. 377th
Security Police Squadron
g.
Task Force 35
h.
Task Force Peter
i.
A
Troop, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
j.
3rd
Squadron, 4th Cavalry 25th Division
k. 1st
Battalion, 18th INF, 1st Division
l.
2nd
Battalion, 27th INF, 25th Division
m. 2nd
Battalion, 327th Regiment, 101st Division
n. 1st
Battalion, 27th Regiment, 25th Division
o. 1
Platoon Armed Helicopters - 120th Aviation Company
p. 3
Counter Mortar Radar Sites
q.
Provisional Battle Group - (Hong Tong Tay Depot Area)
r.
1
Platoon 105mm - ARVN Artillery (TSN) - JDOC
s. 1
Platoon 155mm - ARVN Artillery (Co Loa) - JDOC
t.
1 Composite Rifle Company, 33rd VNAF Wing Defense Control
Group
JDOC
u. 1
Tank Platoon, 33rd VNAF Wing Defense Control Group - JDOC
(This
Page is Unclassified)
2
v.
Miscellaneous R.F. and P.F. Elements throughout TSNSA - JDOC
w.
150 USAF Augmentees to 377th Security Police Squadron (Law
Enforcement Section for escort of personnel from Saigon Area).
x. VNAF and 7th AF TACC
y. 1 Battery 105mm 25 INF Division
z. A
Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Division
7. (C) Intelligence:
a. Pre-attack Intelligence:
(1)
Intelligence reports plus raw information received by JDOC 30 days
prior to the attack indicated to this level of command that some kind of enemy
action would occur during the TET holiday season. The intelligence estimate of
the situation gave the enemy a capability of mounting a large scale rocket or
mortar attack plus a ground attack with a strength of not more than a
reinforced battalion. A training exercise was written on 24 January 1968 and
distributed to the Commanders concerned for appraisal and subsequent
implementation on the night of 26-27 January 1968. The exercise was
designed to test the capabilities of all security forces assigned to the TSN
Sensitive Area. The 051 Gate, considered the most vulnerable point of the
perimeter and the anticipated enemy avenue of approach from the Cambodian
border was selected as the practice enemy point of penetration, Practice
condition YELLOW was initiated at
0025 hours, 27 January 1968. Exercise TET was conducted, including a
commanders' critique at 0500 hours at the JDOC Command Post.
(2)
The intelligence situation for the days immediately preceding the attack
remained relatively unchanged from the normal. There was no significant input
of information indicating that an enemy attack on Tan Son
3
Nhut was
imminent. Intelligence collection agencies identified no significant
changes of the
location, posture, or strength of the enemy forces in the area.
(3) At 1020 hours, 30 January 1968, the
Commander,, 377th Security Police Squadron, declared Security Alert
Condition Grey in effect for his unit in reaction to the increased enemy
activity during the TET truce and the decrease of the Vietnamese Defense Force
units due to the holidays.
b. Post-attack Intelligence Information: The following information
has been collected from numerous intelligence sources, including Seventh Air
Force, MACV, and agencies directly supporting the Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area.
(1)
The attack on Tan Son Nhut Air Base was an integral
part of the enemy offensive
against the Gia Dinh Province and the government of the Republic of South
Vietnam.
(2)
It has been asserted that plans for the attack of Tan Son Nhut were formulated
and discussed by the Viet Cong cadre as early as 22 December 1967. In
subsequent meetings, the attack was planned for the period preceding the TET
holidays.
4
(3)
Intelligence sources reflect that an estimated nine enemy battalions were in
the greater Saigon Area, and at least seven of them were involved in the
attack on Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The enemy battalions in the greater Saigon
area were augmented and supported by approximately twelve identified companies
or larger-size elements of the 5th Division of the North Vietnamese
Army.
(4)
Although all units involved in the attack on Tan Son Nhut Air Base have not
been clearly identified, specific actions of the enemy and the designations of
the attacking units have been established. The roles of enemy units and their
identities are discussed below:
(a)
Unidentified elements of the enemy directed automatic weapons fire onto the
installation in the direction of the POL Storage Area and the C-130
Parking Area. This fire came from an off base position on the east end of the
airfield near the runway approaches.
(b)
Heavy pressure from enemy elements of the C-10 Sapper Battalion and the
2nd Local Force Battalion was exerted on the Joint General Staff Headquarters,
located adjacent to the southeast perimeter of the installation, and a
subsequent penetration by these units was made through the southeast perimeter
fence of JGS.
(c)
Heavy small arms fire was directed towards Gate #2 by unconfirmed enemy
elements. These elements were probably assigned to the 2nd Local Force
Battalion and the C-10 Sapper Battalion.
(d)
Enemy elements, probably from the 6th Local Force Battalion and the
C-10 Sapper Battalion, assaulted the south entry control point of the
MACV Annex, approximately 250 meters southeast of the of the base perimeter
fence. This enemy force is estimated to have been a reinforced company (200+).
5
(e)
Enemy forces estimated at four reinforced battalions mounted an offensive
against the west perimeter of Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The units involved and
their probable tactical deployment are indicated below. The three principal,
battalion-size units were positioned in column at the time of the
assault.
1.
Elements of the C-10 Sapper Battalion approached the fence line via
Lambretta taxi on National Highway #1. The sapper elements dismounted the
vehicle and detonated what is believed to have been a Bangalore Torpedo on the
fence line. The explosion opened a section of the outer perimeter fence, and
the breach was used continuously by the enemy forces for entry onto the
installation. The same elements of the C-10 Sapper Battalion remained
with the initial assault force and penetrated the perimeter. The staging area
of the sapper element was in the vicinity of Phu Cuong Village, approximately
fifteen Kilometers north of Tan Son Nhut Air Base.
2.
The 267th Viet Cong Battalion (Main Force) composed of
approximately 25 per cent NVA, was the lead battalion and the major assault
force in the penetration of the west perimeter. This battalion, like all of
the attacking battalions, had a strength of 450 to 500 men. Members of this
unit made the deepest penetration into the installation. Its staging area was
approximately six Kilometers south of Due Hoa Village, approximately eighteen
Kilometers west of the base.
3.
The 16th Battalion, Viet Cong (Main Force) AKA D-16 (NVA),
was the second unit in line of the assaulting forces. Numerous KIA from this
unit were identified inside and immediately outside the perimeter fence. It is
probable that this battalion was co-located with or at least in close
proximity to the 267th Battalion identified in paragraph (a) above,
since the delineation
of their lines
could not be clearly identified and their dead were co-mingled. The
greatest proportion of this unit was NVA.
4.
The 269th Viet Cong Battalion (Main Force) was the rear unit in
line. It's bivouac area prior to the attack was in the immediate area of Duc
Hoa. This unit was engaged from its eastern and southern flank by elements of
the 53rd Regional Forces Battalion prior to their arrival at the
perimeter fence.
5. The 90th Battalion of the 1st NVA (Cover Number
KB-604) Regiment was located in the VINATEXCO factory northwest of the
breached perimeter fence. This battalion had 12 mortar positions to the
immediate north, west and south of the factory and probably rendered support
fire to the assault forces often referred to by interrogated prisoners. This
unit sustained 170(+) KIA primarily during the air attack on the factory
during the day of 31 January 1968. It has been reported by Vietnamese
intelligence sources that among the many casualties in the factory there were
7 NVA pilots and 15 NVA aircraft technicians.
6.
Supporting elements of these battalions or elements of other unidentified
battalions provided supporting artillery fire for the attacking hostile ground
forces.
8. (C) Security
Police Status:
a.
The total Security Police assigned strength at the time of the hostilities was
890 personnel. Of this total, 75 personnel, or eight percent of the assigned
strength, were TDY, R&R, hospital, or emergency leave status or awaiting
completion of in-country training. (The TDY personnel included
approximately fifty men assigned to three detachments at remote sites.)
7
The present
for duty (PFD) strength was 815 personnel, 56 percent (457) of which were
physically on post at the time of the attack. As a result of being placed on
Red Alert at 1730 hours, 30 January 1968, eight 13 man Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs)
were formed, equipped, and readied for immediate response in the event of
attack. This totaled 104 men, or 13 percent of the PFD strength. The 262
remaining Security Police Personnel, or 32 per cent of the PFD strength, were
armed and billeted in the squadron barracks for immediate recall.
b.
Upon implementation of Condition RED (Option I), three platoons of U.S. Army
personnel (Task Force 35) were alerted and placed on five-minute standby
status as augmentation reserve forces for the 377th Security Police
Squadron. These platoons, composed of 30 men each, were immediately placed
under the operational control of the Commander, 377th Security
Police Squadron, in accordance with published and approved base defense plans.
c. In accordance with existing procedures, the squadron was divided
into
two
flights. The night flight, which was on duty at the time of the attack,
consisted of two officers and 446 airmen. Manning was as follows:
(1) Security Flight
(a)
Supervision
1.
Flight Commander (1st Lt)
1
2.
Assistant Flight Commander
1
3. Joint Defense Operations Center
3
(Liaison and Alternate CSC)
4.
Communicator/Plotter and Clerks
4
5.
CSC Standard SATs (2)
6
-
15
8
(b) Alpha Sector
1. Sector NCOIC
1
2. M-16 Bunkers
23
3. Tower Guards
12
4.
Special Posts (Entry Controllers)
14
5.
SATs (2)
6
6.
MIR M-60 Bunkers (2)
4
(c)
Bravo Sector
2. M‑16 Bunkers
7
3. Tower Guards
6
4.
Area Guards and Entry Controllers
24
5. SATs (2)
9
6. MLR M-60 Bunker (4)
8
55
(d)
Charlie Sector
1.
Sector NCOIC
1
2.
M-16 Bunkers
9
3. Special Posts and Entry Controllers
17
4. SATs (3)
6
5. M-60 Bunker
2
35
(e)
Delta Sector
1.
Sector NCOIC
1
2. Entry Controllers and Revetment Guards 27
3. M-16 Bunkers
15
4. M-60 Bunkers
8
5.
SATs (2)
6
57
(f)
Echo Sector
1.
Sector NCOIC
1
2.
051 Bunker
5
3.
Tower Guards
5
4.
M‑16 Bunkers
12
5.
Revetment, Entry Control, and Special Posts
14
6.
M‑60 Bunkers
3
7.
SATs (2)
7
47
(g)
Foxtrot Sector
1. Sector NCOIC
1
2.
Tower Guards
2
(h)
Reserve SAT
12
TOTAL SECURITY FLIGHT
293
(a) NCOIC
1
(b)
Supervisors
2
(c) Armed Patrol (SAT)
6
(d)
Kennel Support
2
(e)
Sentry Dog Team
47
TOTAL
K-9 SECTION 58
58
(3)
Taw Enforcement Flight
(a)
Flight Commander and Assistant
2
(b) Desk Sergeant, Desk Clerk, and Communicator
4
(d)
Entry Controllers (Gates)
15
(e)
Entry Controllers, Cantonment Areas, and Special
29
Posts
(f)
Seventh Air Force Compound Security Guards
12
(g)
Quick Reaction Team
13
(h) Customs and Terminal Security
8
TOTAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT
101
(4) Others
(a)
Weapons Systems Security Operations Officer
1
(b) Armory
4
TOTAL OTHERS
5
10
TOTAL
ON DUTY
457
(5) Fight 13 man Quick Reaction Teams
104
(6) Reserve Security Policemen
254
(7) Three platoons U.S. Army Reserve (Task
Force 35),
3C men each. 2 Platoons 69th Signal Battalion,
1 Platoon 53rd Trans Battalion)
90
TOTAL
U.S. Security Forces: (377th Security Police Squadron
and Task Force
35 which was under the operational
9. (C) Execution:
- See Battle Description Atch #1
10.(C) Results:
a.
Enemy Losses: The enemy forces sustained 157 KIA (body count) within
the base perimeter, and nine POW's were taken by the friendly forces within
the same area. Immediately outside the perimeter fence, 267 enemy bodies were
counted until the counting action was terminated due to more pressing
operational requirements. All of these enemy KIA and POW were probably
sustained by the C-10 Sapper Unit, 267th Battalion, 16th Battalion, and
the 90th Battalion all of which were identified in paragraph 7b(4)(e) above,
The 269th Battalion all of which were identified in paragraph 7b(4)(e) above,
which was in ground contact with the 53rd Regional Force Battalion with
supporting Light Fire Team dispatched to their area by JDOC, suffered 286 KIA
(US confirmed V.C. body count). Friendly elements (2nd Services Battalion and
Task Force Peter) operating in the O.F. 10 (Gate 10) area accounted for 82+
enemy dead (body count). The total enemy body count, including the 170+ KIA
referred to in para 7b(4)(e)5 above, was 962+.
b.
Friendly Casualties:
KIA
KIA
USAF - 4 (Security Police)
VNAF - 5
U.S. Army – 19
ARVN/RF – 27
USRAF - 11 (Security Police)
VNAF - 12
U.S. Amy – 75
ARVN/RF - 67
TOTAL FRIENDLY KIA
– 55
TOTAL FRIENDLY WIA - 163
c.
A total of 145 weapons were captured on the installation, 43 of which were
crew served. Figures for the off‑base collection of weapons are not
available.
d.
Aircraft Damage:
U.S. Aircraft:
AC-47 (USAF)
9
0
9
C-47 (USAF)
1
0
1
C-54 (USAF)
1
0
1
C-117 (USN)
2
0
2
e. Structural Damage:
(1) 4 Conexes of paint burned (Total Loss)
(2) 1 Trailer Van burned (Total Loss)
(3) 1 Trailer House burned (Total Loss)
(4) 1 Shed roof damaged (Repairable)
(5)
Approximately 400 ft of electrical power cable to a communications
complex was
damaged by a grass fire (Repairable)
(6) Approximately 50 perimeters lights (Repairable)
f.
Runway Damage: A 3’ x 1’ x 3" hole on the edge of the runway
was inflicted by ordnance impact. The runway remained operational and the
damage was repaired the same day.
g.
Enemy Ordnance Collection:
(1) The following
ordnance was collected on the installation:
(a)
22 VC booby traps (locally fabricated)
(b)
8 VC DHB claymore mines
(c)
12 VC DH 10 claymore mines
(d)
37 Chicom B40 rocket mortars
12
(e)
84 Chicom B-40 rockets
(f)
38 USSR PG-7 rockets
(9)
103 Chicom RKC-3TG grenades
(h)
95 VC stick grenades
(i)
40 VC home made grenades
(j)
13 VC plastic explosive charges
(K)
142 Chicom TNT blocks
(l)
17 VC demo kits - satchel charges
(m)
12000 rds Chicom 7.62 intermediate ammo
(n)
2000 rds Chicom 7.62 rimmed ammo
(0)
5 US 81mm mortars, HE
(p)
45 US M26 grenades
(q)
15 US 81mm mortars, illuminating
(r)
65 US 40mm grenades
(s)
19 claymore mines
(t)
5 US 57mm recoilless rifle rds
(U)
47 rds US 50 cal ammo,
(2)
USAF Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units, collecting ordnance off the
installation in the immediate vicinity of the west perimeter fence, detonated
a pile of enemy ordnance estimated to have a high explosive yield of
approximately 100 pounds.
11. (C) Follow‑up
Action: Periodic small arms fire, harassment fire, and enemy movement
around the installation continued through to the rocket attack on Tan Son Nhut
Air Base 18 February 1968. On 10 separate occasions in the four days following
the prepenatration, Security Alert Teams (SATs) of this organization made
direct contact with enemy positions firing small arms and automatic weapons
onto the installation. Two engagements resulted in secondary explosions of the
enemy positions. Friendly forces
13
operating outside the installation made frequent contacts with the enemy near the base. These contacts varied in size, but were all part of the total enemy offensive on Tan Son Nhut and the Saigon area. As of 23 February 1968, 5,519 enemy were KIA (body count) in the greater Saigon area. Sweeping, clearing, and rescuring operations by friendly forces are in effect to this date (4 March 1968). The actions of the enemy clearly substantiate the contention that they have no intention of withdrawing from the area and allowing the installation to revert to its previously secure status. This evaluation is further supported by the fact that post‑attack intelligence revealed that the Viet Cong attack forces had no plan for withdrawal of their units.
12.
(C) Lessons Learned: The concept that Tan Son Nhut Air Base can be
penetrated only by small sapper units and that the enemy has the capability to
launch only small scale operations in the Tan Son Nhut vicinity became
obsolete with the 31 January 1968 attack and the TET Offensive, and a new type
of enemy threat was encountered. A major re-evaluation of present base
defense procedures and principles has become an immediate necessity.
a.
Security Police personnel and augmentees (TF-35) were
well-supervised and well-trained in fire control and discipline
and in basic tactics, but were neither equipped nor trained well enough to
effectively counter a regiment-size enemy assault. Consideration should
be given to Base Security Police receiving more infantry type training prior
to assignment in Southeast Asia. Emphasis should be placed on crew served and
heavy weapons, assault tactics, and deployment procedures. Existing Air Force
training in the ZI and in Southeast Asia is not sufficient to enable Security
Police forces to effectively counter forces of this size, equipped as they
were.
b.
Current concepts of base defense and protection of USAF resources as
established by higher headquarter's directives should be reviewed. In our
opinion too much emphasis is placed on the close‑in protection of
resources. With the weapons available to the enemy, close‑in guards are
useless. Security forces must be moved from the revetments and other
restricted
14
areas to the
perimeter, where they can effectively engage the enemy. Further, we must have
the capability to respond with properly equipped reaction forces. In
conjunction with this, the existing defense alignment of the installation must
be re‑evaluated and changed in light of the new enemy tactics
encountered.
c.
Reaction forces were able to respond quickly and halt the enemy advance. This
was primarily due to the base defense posture at the time of the attack. Had
the Security condition been anything other than RED (Option I) or YELLOW,
reaction forces would have had to contain the enemy further inside the interior of the base, probably at much
greater loss in lives and USAF resources. It is recommended that a larger
standby reaction force be utilized in place of the 12 man Reserve Security
Alert Team (RSAT). A fifty man reaction force properly equipped with the same
immediate response capability as RSAT would more realistically enable Security
Police personnel to halt the enemy at an acceptable distance from priority
resources.
d.
A free fire zone/clear area must be established around the perimeter of the
base. If free fire zones/clear areas had been established the enemy would not
have had easy access to the perimeter fence and much of the small arms
activity would not have taken place. These zones would also have prevented the
enemy from setting up crew served weapon positions and ammunition supply areas
adjacent to the base perimeter. Recommend that the free fire zone be extended
at least 1,000 meters around the perimeter.
e.
Medical personnel should be more readily available to the Security Police.
Their training, manning and employment
should be such that they would be capable of immediate support to the base
defense operation. Entry of medical personnel into the affected area and
subsequent evacuation of wounded became an acute problem during the battle. If
medical personnel are to continue to be employed in this theater of operation,
independent of base defense forces, they must establish and maintain a close
liaison with
15
the Security
Police to insure that they are fully aware of the positioning of all defensive
units and routes of entry into all areas. In addition, medical personnel must receive
sufficient combat training
to enable them to effectively perform under hostile fire.
f.
A more stringent control of weapons issue to non-defensive force
personnel is immediately required. Many of these personnel hampered the
Security Police effort and on some occasions were nearly mistaken for hostile
forces. Personnel should be instructed to take cover, and weapons should not
be issued until Security Condition RED (Option II) is declared.
g.
It has been determined from battlefield reports that at the point of
penetration some personnel of the 2nd Services Battalion (ARVN) deserted their
static defense posts. Reasons
for the desertion have not been established, but an investigation is being
conducted by the Vietnamese authorities. From these reports, it is apparent
that there is need for closer coordination between Vietnamese and U.S. Forces
involved in the combined defense of an installation. All indications point to
an absolute need for the co‑manning of defensive positions throughout
the perimeter.
h.
Local intelligence data available to the base defense forces was entirely void
of information pertinent to enemy plans and movements in the immediate area.
Defense force personnel must assume that future intelligence reports have
questionable validity. They must maintain a posture that will render them
totally prepared for an attack at any time, regardless of intelligence
indicators.
i.
The most significant lesson learned from the attack, and the one which
requires the most immediate attention, is the need for more and better
equipment. Heavier weapons are urgently needed to effectively combat
penetrating forces.
(1)
XM-148 Grenade launchers proved to be difficult to operate under combat
conditions. Their use is extremely limited during the hours of darkness as
their design requires a special sighting device which is useless during
darkness. Recommend we consider bringing M-79 Grenade Launchers back
into the Air Force inventory, and its wide variety of ordnance (HE,
illumination, canister, white phosphorous, etc.) be obtained for maximum
utilization. As an alternate solution, recommend the sighting mechanism of the
XM-148 be corrected immediately to allow for effective night‑time
employment.
(2)
Mortars should be considered for direct support illumination and for direct HE
fire against attacking ground forces and enemy support fire positions.
(3)
Recoilless rifles would have been of great assistance in destroying positions
adjacent the West perimeter and inside the 051 Bunker. The counter attack
would have been started much earlier and completed at less cost to friendly
forces if reaction forces had been able to suppress and destroy enemy
crew-served positions.
(4)
Some type of rocket launcher is a must. The Amy has in its inventory a light
anti-tank weapon (LAW) which is considered ideal for destroying
reinforced enemy positions. The LAW could be carried as part of a Security
Alert Team's equipment. The weapon is easily operated and the launcher is
disposable after use. Its incorporation into the Security Police inventory
would be an immediate and noteworthy improvement.
(5)
In conjunction with the need for heavier weapons and increased fire power, the
safe transportation of this equipment and personnel is a must. Armored
personnel carriers (APCs) are considered the most appropriate vehicle for this
transportation. These vehicles can be utilized for transportation to the
affected area, heavy weapons support fire, and evacuation of injured.
Although
neither this nor any other vehicle will provide total-safety for the
personnel, it will provide protection from small arms and small caliber
automatic weapons fire.
(6)
It was evident during the attack that the present communications system
employed by Security Police personnel was completely unsatisfactory. There is
a strong need for more powerful portable units, able to receive all units
involved in the defense operation. This would alleviate the problem of units
cutting each other out because they did not receive other units transmitting.
Power sources which can sustain operational requirements over an extended
period of time are necessary for these radio units. Had the installation been
subjected to more than one penetration, multi-channel (more than two)
radios would have been required to successfully contain and destroy the
attacking forces.
(7)
Direct communications with supporting units (LFTs, AC-47s, Flare Ships,
etc.) is an immediate requirement. This capability is essential for effective
direct control of supporting units on the scene by in-place Security
Police supervisory personnel. During the initial phases of the battle,
requests for and direction of specific support fire had to be relayed from
on-scene positions through Security Police radio channels to JDOC, which
relayed the requests and directions to the supporting units. The resulting
time lag made the supporting fire less effective than it would have been if
direct communications had been available.
J.
The above lessons learned of course apply to operations in SEA. We do not
intend to imply that these recommendations would apply Air Force wide.
(This Page is Unclassified)
13. (U)
Security Classification: This report is classified Confidential/ NOFORN
because it reflects detailed information relative to damage of U.S. resources
resulting from enemy attack and describes counter measures employed by free
world forces in response to enemy actions. Reproduction of this document in
whole or in part by recipients is authorized on an as needed basis.
FOR
THE COMMANDER
BILLY J.
CARTER, Lt Col, USAF
2 Atch
Chief,
Security Police
1. Battle Description
2.
Glossary
19
(This Page is Unclassified)
BATTLE
DESCRIPTION
1. On the nights
of 30-31 January 1968, all security forces were in condition Yellow with
the exception of the 377th Security Police Squadron, which was in
Condition Red.
2. At
approximately 2100 hours, 30 January 1968, the 53rd Airfield Security
Battalion (RF) received intelligence information from JDOC that approximately 80
Viet Cong were moving west to east at the vicinity of the village of Xom Go Mayh
coordinates XS754964. The battalion immediately organized a twenty man patrol
and moved on a large sweep from coordinates XS774939 to XS776934 to XS7639146.
The patrol then moved to XS773948 and set up an ambush (Approximately 2345
hours). At 0145 hours the patrol, having seen nothing that would indicate the
movement of troops, moved to vicinity coordinates XS771950 and then returned to
the Battalion CP; two kilometers west of the TSN base perimeter.
3. At 0300
hours, JDOC was informed that the US Embassy and the Saigon Radio Station were
under attack. At 0305 hours JDOC was notified that the Vietnamese Joint General
Staff (JGS) Compound was under attack. Condition Red was put into affect and all
commanders reported to JDOC. At approximately 0320 hours, the guard in Tower #16
(ESE corner of the installation) reported observing small arms fire directed at
the POL area from an off base position. A Sector Primary Security Alert Team and
a CSC Standard SAT were dispatched. (The situation was monitored on the scene by
the Operations Officer and the Flight Commander) Quick Reaction Teams (QRT's)
and Task Force 35 (Army Reserve Augmentation Forces) were briefed and dispatch
to pre‑designated rendezvous points.
4. At
approximately 0320 hours, Gate #2, (ESE perimeter of the base near
Atch 1
J.G.S) reported small arms, fire into their location from off base positions. A
Sector SAT was dispatched.
5.
At approximately 0327 hours, a Security Alert Team reported that heavy small
arms and automatic weapons fire was being received off the east perimeter and
directed at the POL area. (This report was received at JDOC from both U.S. and
VN guard positions).
6.
At approximately 0330 hours, 31 January 1968 the guards on the northern bunker
of 53rd RF Bn Compound gave the alarm that several hundred man were
moving west to east approximately 400 meters north of the CP. Approximately five
minutes later, the guards reported hearing the sound of automatic weapons fire
from the direction of the airfield, At approximately 0330 hours, Tan Son Nhut
Sensitive Area placed a helicopter Light Fire Team under the control of the 53rd
Bn, 3rd Co. The LFT was
directed to strafe the area where the enemy troops were concentrated.
7.
At approximately 0333 hours, the 051 bunker (E-6, Southwest perimeter
fence line) reported that grenades and mortar rounds were being fired towards
the western perimeter, but were falling short. A Sector SAT (E-1), a CSC
Standard SAT (C-2), and the Reserve Sat (RSAT) were dispatched. (This
report was received at JDOC thru both U.S. and VN guard positions).
8.
At approximately 0334 hours, E-6 reported that he observed approximately
twenty‑five individuals east of the first tree line, approximately 100
meters off the west perimeter fence line, directing small arms and automatic
weapons fire towards the west perimeter. Fire was returned by static friendly
positions and responding units.
9.
At approximately 0340 hours, the 051 Bunker reported that they had 2
2
been hit by a
mortar or rocket and that mortar or rocket rounds were landing on base. CSC
dispatched an ambulance to the 051 Bunker to evacuate the wounded. The ambulance
however, was unable to reach the bunker due to the heavy enemy fire.
10. At
approximately 0344 hours, the 051 Bunker reported the west perimeter fence was
being breached near the 051 Gate (75 meters north of the 051 Bunker) and that
enemy forces were coming onto the base. The Echo QRT and two platoons of Task
Force 35 were dispatched to the area and deployed as the initial blocking force.
11. At approximately 0345 hours, two additional QRTs were dispatched and
deployed along with the Echo QRT and the two platoons of Task Force 35. These
units were deployed parallel to and approximately 100 meters north of Taxiway
W-6 to preclude further enemy infiltration to the East.
12. At
approximately 0347 hours, Echo Sector SAT reported the Echo Main Line of
Resistance (MIR) was taking mortars or rockets.
13. At
approximately 0355 hours, an explosive round, possibly a 40mm grenade, landed
adjacent to the operations building of the 2nd Services Battalion
located near Gate #10 (OF 10) approximately 300 meters South of the POL Storage
Area. Within 2 or 3 minutes heavy enemy small arms, automatic weapons fire, and
RPG-2 rocket fire was being directed at the friendly positions all along
the Gate #10 Area.
14. At
approximately 0359 hours, Tower A, (southwest perimeter fence, fifty meters east
of the 051 Gate) reported that hostile forces were mounting an assault south of
his tower and that a light fire team was making contact with the enemy in the
fields west of the base.
15. At
approximately 0410 hours, in the vicinity of coordinates XS783954
3
the
previously dispatched 53/13 R.F. Company patrol engaged what was then believed to be
an enemy platoon. The patrol exchanged fire with the enemy for approximately
five minutes and, due to the enemy's obvious effort to surround the unit, they
withdrew south approximately 200 meters and called in a LFT for assistance. The
LFT strafed the area with MG and rocket fire. A subsequent search of the area
revealed 5 VC KIA at the location of the fire‑fight and 65 VC KIA (Body
count) in the field surrounding the scene. It is believed that this unit was the
reinforcing elements for the attack on the airfield. After disengaging with no
friendly losses the unit moved back to the Battalion CP for resupply of
ammunition.
17. At
approximately 0415 hours, the 2nd Services Battalion Commander
committed one platoon of his reaction forces with two U.S. Advisors to the 051
Gate Area. When the platoon arrived within 100 meters of the 051 Bunker (VN) it
began to receive enemy fire from that bunker. A member of the platoon was
dispatched in an attempt to determine whether the bunker was friendly or enemy.
The soldier was wounded by small arms from the bunker and the remainder of the
platoon immediately engaged the position. The enemy then turned the captured
ARVN 57MM Recoilless Rifle onto the friendly position, fired two rounds and
injured one U.S. Advisor and one member of the platoon.
18. At
approximately 0422 hours, sector SAT (E-1) reported that they were pinned
down about twenty meters Southwest of the 051 Bunker by heavy enemy small arms
and automatic weapons fire.
19. Enemy
pressure continued around the entire perimeter with hostile mortar or rocket
rounds, small arms and automatic weapons fire, and physical probes at various
locations. One QRT and one SAT were deployed at the 055 Gate (extreme north end
of the base) to reinforce ARVN personnel deployed in that area. One QRT and two
SATs were deployed at the northeast section of the POL Storage Area in reaction
to intensified enemy fire in that area. One QRT was deployed at Gate #1 and Gate
#2 (south perimeter of the base and Main Gate area) in reaction to enemy fire
that was being directed into these positions from off-base sites. The
third and uncommitted platoon of Task Force 35 was held in reserve at JDOC. An
additional QRT was held in reserve in the eastern quadrant of the base in
support of the heavily engaged units on the east and southeast perimeter. One
QRT was deployed in support of ARVN personnel defending the 056 Gate (058
Bunker, northeast perimeter) which was receiving intense enemy fire from
off-base positions. One rifle company (Task Force Peter) from MACV Annex
was deployed on the southern flank of Gate #10 in response to the ground assault
on MACV Annex and Gate #10 that was well in progress.
21. At this
point, an estimated reinforced battalion of enemy forces had penetrated the
western perimeter and was maneuvering to flank the blocking forces in the area.
5
22. At
approximately 0515 hours, several units in the blocking positions were running
out of ammunition and requests for resupply were made. Resupply was accomplished
by Security Police and Advisory Team personnel. The friendly units continued
their intense small arms and automatic weapons fire into the enemy positions,
causing heavy enemy casualties.
24. At
approximately 0529 hours, enemy troops were sighted by Tower #1 near the
Alpha/Echo Sector line. CSC dispatched a Sector SAT and two QRTs to deploy on a
line east and west, north of runway 25L, to block any further enemy movement to
the north. At this point, the enemy had penetrated approximately 600 meters into
the base in an area approximately 300 meters wide.
25. At
approximately 0545 hours, the Senior Advisor Capital Military District advised
the Senior Advisor TSNSA that Gen Ware was in command of all U.S. Forces in the
CMD. Gen Ware immediately placed C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cav, under
operational control of TSNSA. He further stated that the unit was enroute to
assist and would be on the TSN Advisory Team command radio frequency.
26. At
approximately 0551 hours, Tower #1 reported friendly units were making contact
with enemy positions west of the base.
27. The 53rd
R.F. Bn, upon returning to its camp, was advised that several hundred VC were
moving west to east approximately 600 to 800 meters north
6
of the Bn CP.
The order to open fire from both northern CP Bunkers was given.
29. At
approximately 0603 hours, Tower #1 reported some of the enemy were withdrawing
through a break in the perimeter fence south of the 051 Gate.
30. At
approximately 0624 hours, the entire blocking force was subjected to an intense
enemy rocket and mortar barrage.
31. At
approximately 0630 hours, C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cav (less one platoon)
arrived in the area after fighting its way down Highway #1 from its base camp at
Cu Chi, 20 miles NNW of TSN. They were employed in a flanking movement from the
north and attacked the enemy assault force just outside the perimeter. This
attack enabled the defense units countering the penetration to mount an internal
counterattack.
32. At
approximately 0635 hours, the counterattack began, with the two companies of
Vietnamese Airborne in conjunction with U.S. military units located south,
north, and east of the enemy positions. The initial drive met fierce resistance
after advancing approximately 100 meters, and the Base Joint Defense Team was
forced to hold and call in more support from artillery and the light fire teams.
33. From approximately 0635 hours to approximately 0730 hours, posts in Alpha,
(northwest thru northeast) Bravo (East) and Foxtrot (South) Sectors reported
small arms and automatic weapons fire coming onto the base. The counterattack
moved slowly toward the west perimeter as the advancing friendly troops were
pinned down frequently by heavy enemy fire.
7
34. At
approximately 0645 hours, the 53rd R.F. Company reported that a VC
Battalion had taken over the village of Tau Phu located at coordinates XS793854
and had surrounded the company CP located at XS794928. The 531 company
commander, took a patrol out to check VC positions. He was subsequently killed,
and the Viet Cong hung his body in front of the CP and cremated it. At
approximately 0645 hours an element of 53rd R.F. Battalion moved out
of the CP to the northwestern edge of the village of Ba Queo vicinity XS782946,
less than 500 meters SSW of the 051 Bunker, and broke up what is believed to
have been a reinforced two-company assault team. (A subsequent search of
the area revealed 169 enemy bodies at coordinates XS785954).
36. At approximately 0730 hours, the remaining platoon of C Troop,
3rd Squadron, 4th Cav, arrived on the scene and was directed to enter the base
through the OF 55 Gate and proceed to the OF 51 Gate in order to relieve the
pressure on C Troop, which was intensively engaged.
37. At
approximately 0725 hours, the defensive lines received a heavy concentration of
enemy fire under which the enemy
started another assault on the friendly counterattack line. They were
unsuccessful. Heavy enemy fire followed this re-assault, which is now
believed to have been utilized to cover the withdrawal of their wounded and part
of the main force which
8
was still inside
the perimeter.
38. At
approximately 0759 hours, Tower #1 reported mortar rounds were falling into the
southern portion of the Airborne area. This action probably relates directly to
the purpose mentioned in paragraph 38 above.
39. B Troop, 3rd
Squadron, 4th Cav, plus an artillery battery from the 25th Division arrived at
the scene of the battle. They attacked the enemy flank from the north with all
units on line just outside of the base perimeter. This action relieved the
pressure of the penetration and completely occupied the enemy exploitation
force.
40. During this
time, with support from the Cav units and their artillery and constant fire
support from Light Fire Teams, the counterattacking forces slowly gained
momentum. As a result of this action,
Tower #1 reported more enemy
were trying to withdrew through the breach in the perimeter fence between the
051 Bunker and 051 Gate.
41. At
approximately 0930 hours, the U.S. units on the north flank of the counterattack
line successfully occupied the area from just south of the 051 Gate, north along
the west perimeter. The units continued to draw small arms, automatic weapons,
and rocket fire from the enemy positions just off the west perimeter for several
hours.
42. The VN
Airborne unit on the south flank of the counterattacking force continued to take
heavy casualties and again started falling back. The 051 Bunker, in the
possession of the enemy since early in the morning, was directing heavy small
arms and automatic weapons fire into the southern flank.
43. At
approximately 1000 hours, the Airborne unit withdrew to just north of Tower #3
and set up their defensive positions while the U.S. tanks from the 3/4 Cav
and LFT attempted to knock out the 051 Bunker.
44. At
approximately 1015 hours, one of the LFTs was reported shot down
9
on the vast
perimeter between the 052 and 052A Bunkers. Three LFTs were downed in the
vicinity of the vast perimeter during the morning battle.
46. At
approximately 1217 hours, the broach was closed and the perimeter was secured.
Hostile fire was received from the enemy positions off the west end of the base
for several hours.
47. Throughout
the eight‑hour battle on the vast perimeter, heavy fighting continued at
Gate #10 and MACV Annex. At approximately 1300 hours, these other areas were
declared secured and a VC body count of 82+ was accredited.
48. At
approximately 1400 hours, the 8th Airborne Battalion, (ARVN) the 1st
Marine Bn (ARVN), and 4th Marine Battalion (ARVN) were committed by
JDOC to attack and
clear the depot area of Hong Tong Tay (adjacent to the NNE perimeter
fence), which
was under siege by heavy Viet Cong
forces. The 8th Airborne Battalion was halted in the built up area southeast of Gate #10 approximately 500 meters from the base by
intensive enemy fire. The lot
and 4th Marine Battalions continued the attack and secured the VN
Armor Compound and the Co Loa Artillery Compound located in the Hong Tang Tay
Area. Heavy enemy resistance was
encountered which forced
the three battalions to set up defensive positions just prior
to nightfall.
49. The
1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, 1st
Division, was placed under the operational control of TSNSA. An attack plan was
issued by JDOC
10
placing
the 3/4 Cav, the 53rd RF Battalion, and the reinforced base perimeter
in blocking roles, with the 1/18th Inf Bn attacking the enemy in a
north westerly direction. This action was designed to force the enemy's main
body to
disperse into the blocking forces. The enemy broke contact just before dark.
The enemy had withdrawn to the southwest into Ba Queo and toward Phu
50.
A Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cav, 1st Division,
the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, 25th
Division, and the 2nd Battalion, 327th Regiment, 101st
Airborne were placed under the operational control of TSNSA and the following
defensive positions were established against the threat of another enemy attack.
The positions were established in addition to the re-established
and reinforced defensive perimeter posture of the primary defense forces:
a. The 2/327/101st Airborne (less I company) - blocking
position behind the 051 Gate area of penetration.
b.
The 1/18/1st Division (less I company) - placed in reserve in
the southwest section of the base near the 25L runway.
c.
The 2/27/25th Division (less 1 company) - mobilized by the 377th
Combat Support Group as a rapid reaction force stationed at the U.S. Army
Heliport (southwest section of the base).
d.
The 3/4 Cav, 25th Division with one company of the 2/27/25th
11
Division
attached - positioned to the immediate south of the 056 Gate (058 Bunker)
as a rapid reaction force against the enemy threat from the northwest.
e.
One company of the 2/327/101st and one company of the 1/18/1st
Division placed in perimeter defense around MACV Headquarters. Disposition of
the above elements was completed by 21.00 hours. The base was considered secured
at this time. At 2215 hours, Lt Col Coung resumed command of all Vietnamese
forces and Colonel Thebeau with elements of headquarters, 2nd
Brigade, 1st Inf Division, assumed command of all U.S. Army Forces by
order of Major General Ware, Commander) II Field Force Forward.
THIS
PAGE
IS UNCLASSIFIED
JDOC -
Joint Defense Operation Center
ARVN -
Army Republic Of Vietnam
TSNSA -
Tan Son Nhut Sensitive Area
TSN - Tan
Son Nhut
O.F. -
Perimeter Post Identifier
VNAF -
Vietnamese Air Force
R.F. -
Regional Forces
P.F. -
Popular Forces
AFAT - Air
Force Advisory Team
Task Force 35 - US Army Augmentation Forces From MACV Annex to 377th Security
Police Squadron
Task
Force Peter - US Army Augmentation Forces from MACV Annex In Support
of MACV Compound
TACC -
Tactical Air Control Center
J.G.S.
- Joint General Staff (South Vietnamese High Command)
Atch #2
THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
