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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225
AVDCCG
29 November 1968
COMMANDERS COMBAT NOTE NUMBER 20
SUBJECT: Combat Action Analysis Number 6
1. Reaction . . . . a key word in our combat environment. As soldiers, we are trained individually to react automatically and positively to any enemy action. As a fire team, battalion or division, we are prepared to react collectively to any enemy initiative. And, when we are required to react, we are faced with the sternest test for any soldier or any military unit -- in quick order to blunt the enemy's initiative, to seize that initiative ourselves and to punish the enemy decisively for daring to strike at us.
2. There have been many fine examples provided to us on the subject of reaction, and the attached combat action analysis stands as one of the most prominent. As you read and in turn discuss it with others, pay particular attention to the speed and decisiveness which a unit can and must apply to a reaction situation. Here a commander demonstrated the classic defense against an enemy attack. He attacked.
1 Incl ELLIS W. WILLIAMSON
as Major General, USA
Commanding
In the early stages of this war,
there existed doubt that armor and mechanized forces would play a significant
role in the fighting. The terrain and the environment which characterized
South Vietnam and the guerrilla nature of the warfare here were factors which
argued against the employment of armor and mechanized infantry. As a precedent,
the French before us had attempted the use of such forces with less than
acceptable results.
There were those, however, who held that armor and mechanized infantry did have
a valid contribution to make to the combat that was taking place.
Accordingly, armor and mechanized units were committed to battle in order to
test their application to the situation which existed. The record show the
combat success we have enjoyed in the use of the potent weapons of armor.
The combat action we are about to
review serves well to illustrate the devastation effect of armor's shock action,
firepower and mobility and mechanized infantry's superior maneuverability in
this environment. It will also demonstrate how good commanders and good
subordinate and junior leaders, by the calm and professional application of the
combat power that is immediately available to them, can win in a fluid and
doubtful combat situation.
In fact, for those of us who study
the chronology and history of the significant actions of this war, the action we
are about to consider may well prove to be one of the key turning points on the
fighting that has taken place in the last seven years.
Exactly what was happening was for the most part unknown and the situation at
the moment could best be described as confusing. But, there was no doubt
in the mind of the cavalry squadron S3 that something big was taking place and
in short order his unit was going to be in the thick of it.
The 0400 hours call from the division
tactical operations center (DTOC) gave him the be prepared mission to move one
troop southeast to a strategic town on the northwestern outskirts of SAIGON and
the huge TON SON NHUT Airbase complex.
The S3 immediately alerted C Troop
(minus one platoon) which was available at the division base camp. The
squadron's other two ground troops were deployed along the main supply route (MSR)
to the northwest of the base. B Troop was located at a bridge site 15
kilometers up the road and A Troop was positioned at an artillery fire support
base 28 kilometers away. The detached C Troop platoon was providing
security for a critical MSR bridge 10 kilometers to the southeast in the
vicinity to which the remainder of the troop was preparing to move (see sketch #
1).
Having no contingency plan for a
reaction mission to the town to the southeast and with no information concerning
what was taking place there, the S3 immediately drove to the DTOC to discuss the
situation with the division G3. Information available to the operations
officer and his staff at the DTOC was sketchy. The division had received a
be prepared mission from its higher headquarters to react to an enemy threat in
the vicinity of the town, but the exact nature of the threat had not been
defined.
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While the S3 was at the DTOC, division received the order to send immediately
one cavalry troop into the town. There it would be met by a representative
of the major command headquarters for the area who would provide further
instructions. This mission and special instructions were passed to the
squadron S3, and at approximately 0430 hours the tanks and armored personnel
carriers (APC) of the Headquarters element and two platoons of C Troop moved in
column formation through the main gate of the division base camp and turned
southeast down the MSR.
Since the area to which the troop was
moving was not in the squadron's normal area of operations, few maps of the
vicinity were available within the squadron headquarters. As the troop
commander moved out he was able to locate one map of the area. He
personally had been in the area only once during his tour and was only vaguely familiar
with the terrain and surroundings in which he would be operating.
As the troop wheeled southeast along
the MSR, the troop commander ordered his vehicles off the highway to move
cross-country parallel to the roadway. He reasoned that if anything big
was taking place to his southeast, the enemy might well attempt to interdict the
MSR with mines, road blocks and ambushes to cut off reinforcements.
While the troop was reacting towards
the town, a message was received at division TOC from higher headquarters
changing the unit's original mission. The troop was to proceed with all
haste beyond the town and further south to TON SON NHUT Airbase which was under
attack from the west by an estimated 300 enemy troops. The troop would be
met on the MSR before
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it reached the airbase by a jeep which would guide the unit to the location
where it was needed.
In response to this message, the DTOC
requested information concerning the situation at TON SON NHUT: namely, on
which side of the road was the enemy located, what information was available
relative to the enemy units which were in the area, and did the troop have
clearance to fire all its organic weapons in this heavily populated and
developed area? In the confusion which existed at the time, no direct
reply to these questions was forthcoming before the troop was doing battle.
As C Troop approached the town, the
change of mission message was flashed to it over the squadron command radio
net. With these new instructions in affect, the troop commander ordered
his column to roll past the town and remain on the road to push the remaining
nine kilometers to the western approaches to TON SON NHUT. As it moved
down the road, the column encountered no resistance. The troop commander
noted, however, that the several villages and populated areas along the way were
deserted (see sketch # 2).
Approaching the airbase at
approximately 0700 hours, the column found no jeep waiting along the road to
serve as its guide. The troop commander directed his unit to continue
moving. In the vicinity of the west gate to TON SON NHUT, the tanks and
armored personnel carriers came under heavy automatic weapons and small arms
fire from a large textile factory on the west side of the highway (see
sketch # 3).
Returning this fire as it moved, the
column continued approximately 200 meters south of the factory where the lead
tank was struck by a
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rocket propelled grenade (RPG). The crippled tank came to a halt blocking
the highway and stopping the remainder of the column behind it.
Immediately the troop came under heavy fire from both sides of the road.
The cavalrymen dismounted and deployed to the ditches along the road to return
the enemy's fire. The mounted cannon and 50 caliber machine guns on the
tanks and APC's also swung into action laying down a heavy screen of fire to
both the east and west.
Unknown to the troop commander at the
time was the fact that his unit had sliced directly across the path of a three
battalion enemy assault on TON SON NHUT Airbase from the west. His column
had come to a halt in such a position as to cut off an estimated 300 enemy troop
who had breached the airbase perimeter and occupied the western end of the
active east-west runway from the main body of the enemy force which was moving
in from the west in anticipation of throwing a knockout blow at the airbase.
The crossfire in which the troop
found itself was intense. One tank and three armored personnel carriers
were knocked out by the initial outburst of fire and were aflame. Within
five minutes, the troop commander was seriously wounded and unconscious on the
deck of an APC and the other officers in the formation were either killed or
wounded. Command of the troop was taken by a sergeant-first-class who
directed the unit's actions until the arrival of reinforcements. One of
the sergeant's first actions was to radio a situation report to his squadron
commander and request reinforcements and supporting fires.
The squadron commander's reaction to
this call was immediate and
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threefold. A request had earlier been placed with the division G3 to
release the detached C Troop platoon from its bridge security mission so that it
could join its parent unit at TAN SON NHUT. This request had initially
been denied. When he learned that C Troop was in heavy contact and the
situation at TON SON NHUT was extremely critical, the squadron commander again
made the request which this time was quickly approved. At approximately
0710 hours, the platoon at the bridge was ordered to move immediately down the
14 kilometers separating it from the contact area to reinforce the troop.
Secondly, B Troop which was located
at the bridge site northwest of the division base camp and 39 kilometers from
the contact area had been given a be prepared mission at 0430 hours to react to
the C Troop move to the south should that maneuver develop a contact. At
approximately 0710 hours, B Troop was given the order to reinforce C Troop at
TON SON NHUT. Already mounted and ready to move, B Troop was on the road
and racing to the southeast at maximum speed within minutes.
Thirdly, as soon as the C Troop
contact was reported, the squadron commander requested and received permission
from the DTOC to scramble the helicopter gunships from D Troop, the squadron's
organic air cavalry unit. Within minutes of the request for supporting
fires, these gunships were airborne for the five minute flight to the airbase.
The C Troop platoon located on the
bridge to the northeast of TAN SON NHUT mounted up and pushed down the road
towards the airbase on order. At approximately 0730 hours the platoon was
approaching the
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contact area. At this point, the platoon leader was contacted over the
radio by the squadron commander who had arrived over the contact area in his
command and control (C and C) helicopter only moments before. The squadron
commander had made a rapid estimate of the situation. Fully aware of the
forces that were available to him, he quickly devised a plan to destroy the
massive enemy force he could now observe moving on C Troop and the airbase from
the west.
Instead of ordering the platoon to
link up with its parent troop by driving straight down the road, the squadron commander
directed the platoon column to turn east off the MSR at an airbase gate several
hundred meters north of the contact area. He then guided the platoon to
the western end of the active east-west runway where a base security force was
engaging the enemy troop who had penetrated the perimeter. Bringing the
platoon on line facing the enemy, the squadron commander ordered the column to
drive through the enemy formation to link up with the troop several hundred
meters away on the road (see sketch # 4).
With hesitating, the platoon moved
forward at high speed rolling over the startled enemy to its front. This
maneuver, in addition to killing many enemy, created havoc with the enemy
formation causing it to disperse and scatter. As the platoon rolled to its
link up, the enemy force to the rear of C Troop was no longer an effective
fighting formation and was easily handled by the airbase security personnel who
counter attacked to exploit the situation.
While the platoon was executing this
maneuver, four armed helicopters
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of D Troop arrived on station over the contact area. The squadron
commander ordered the gunships to concentrate their automatic weapons and rocket
fire on the large number of enemy troop now congested in the large open field to
the immediate west of C Troop's position on the road. At this point, C
Troop's fire had pinned down the lead elements of this enemy force, and the
remainder continuing its advance was piling up directly behind the stalled lead
elements. Large groups of enemy suddenly found themselves in a exposed
position as the four helicopters raked them with repeated strafing passes up and
down the field.
The sudden appearance of the armored
column across his route of advance, the maneuvering of the platoon to link up
with its parent troop and the devastating attack of the helicopter gunships
served to throw the enemy attacking forces into general confusion. At
approximately 0815 hours, the B Troop commander advised his squadron commander
that the lead vehicles in the troop column were rapidly approaching TAN SON
NHUT.
The column had raced the 39
kilometers between its original position and the contact area in approximately
one hour (see sketch # 5). In
route the troop had encountered no resistance by fire but did smash through
several hastily constructed roadblocks that appeared across the road. The
troop commander did not have a map of the area, and he was requesting
instructions from the squadron commander. With this the squadron commander
still over the battlefield in his command and control helicopter was ready to
apply the final blow to his hastily devised plan to destroy the enemy attack (see
sketch # 6).
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Coordinating all elements on his his squadron command radio net, the commander
directed the helicopter gunships to take up positions on the southern flank of
the battlefield and to seal that escape route by fire.
He then directed B Troop to execute a
column right off the MSR on to the unimproved road which formed the northern
flank of the battlefield, The lead platoon of the troop was to continue
approximately 1,000 meters to the west, do a column left and come up on
line. There the platoon was to establish a blocking position sealing the
battle area on the west to destroy enemy attempting to escape in that direction.
The headquarters element of B Troop
was instructed to direct its fire on the enemy located in the factory complex to
the north of the contact area. The remaining two platoons were ordered to
come on line along the enemy's northern flank and from that position attack to
the south through the enemy. The two platoons were to push to the southern
end of the battlefield, turn about and attack back to its starting
position, In the meantime, C Troop was to maintain its position on the
road and support B Troop's movement across its front by fire.
Within minutes all elements were in
position, and the squadron commander ordered the attack. The speed with
which the maneuver developed, the crushing effect and firepower of the tanks and
armored personnel carriers attacking into his midst and the presence and
firepower of the cavalry elements on three sides created chaos in the enemy's
formation causing it to disperse and scatter. The two platoon line pushed
through the enemy, wheeled about and again rolled over the enemy
positions. By the time the
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tanks and armored personnel carriers returned to their initial positions, the
enemy attack was broken and his troops were withdrawing in all directions.
Sporadic fighting in the contact area
continued throughout the morning and into the afternoon. Pockets of enemy
troops had dug into hastily prepared positions within the contact area and had
to be dislodged in close fighting. In addition, the squadron turned its
tanks to the task of blasting and crushing airbase perimeter bunker position
that had been occupied by the enemy and were being stubbornly defended.
The squadron also oriented its fires
on the enemy occupied factory. Late in the morning and throughout the
afternoon U.S. and South Vietnamese Air Force fighter bombers delivered repeated
strikes against the enemy lodged within the several buildings which made up the
complex. By the time these attacks were completed, the factory had been
leveled and was aflame, and the enemy had been forced out.
These later actions notwithstanding,
however, the squadron had won its battle several hours earlier with the
destruction of the enemy assault on the airbase.
A reorganization and muster of the
squadron's units on the west side of the airbase late in the afternoon revealed
the 15 cavalrymen had been killed in the intense fighting while 23 were
wounded. The squadron also lost one tank and three armored personnel
carriers. A police of the battlefield over a two day period turned up over
400 enemy bodies, 348 of which were attributed directly to the squadron's
actions.
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LESSONS LEARNED
Planning and advanced preparation are two principles of military operations
which are taught to us from our first day in the Army. Properly, we
consider them essential elements to a successful military operation. Yet,
we must be prepared to strike swiftly on the spur of the moment, so to speak,
and win without the benefit of detailed plans and preparations. In the
final analysis, the challenge to a unit to do so represents the most critical
test of the commander, the unit's leadership and its fighting spirit and
ability. Let's reconsider some of the salient points that present
themselves in the action we have just reviewed.
The commander acted swiftly and
boldly because this is what the situation demanded. No prior planning was
involved, but the commander quickly realized that an all out counterattack with
all the combat power he possessed was the only solution to a critical situation.
Although he was striking directly
into a numerically superior enemy force, he was aware that the enemy infantry
exposed in an attack posture was vulnerable to the firepower and maneuverability
of the armored force under his control provided that the armor struck
swiftly. To have hesitated to take detailed stock of the situation would
have resulted in a disaster.
The manner in which the commander maneuvered
the reinforcing platoon correctly relieved the pressure on one side of the
threatened troop on the road and enabled that unit to concentrate all its
resources in the direction of the principle enemy effort. never allow a
situation to stand where the enemy has the ability to force a unit to divide its
firepower in more than one direction!
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The commander's actions, however, in
dividing the striking power of his second ground troop was a calculated risk
that could only be justified by quickness on the part of his attacking
force. Here, though, it becomes apparent that the commander was confident
in the ability of his subordinate units to strike with the speed that was
required. The corollary of the previous lesson then presents itself:
divide your forces and your firepower when you know your dispersed forces
possess the capability of overpowering the enemy.
A word about the single factor that underlies
the entire action by the cavalry squadron -- seizure of the initiative. We
must always keep foremost in our minds the vital concept of taking the
initiative. If the enemy at any time has the initiative, we must
concentrate on taking it away from him and punishing him severely for daring to
attack us. the deciding factors in the squadron's victory over a larger
enemy force, in my opinion, were the powerful physical and psychological momentum
that the reinforcing elements developed as they raced to the contact area and
the wisdom of the squadron commander in not slowing down the rolling effect of
there units as they literally crashed into and rolled over the enemy in their
path. This is initiative . . . . mechanical and human forward motion . . .
. in its purest form and it won this battle and will win many others for
us. We want always to think in terms of hitting the enemy fast and hitting
him hard!
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